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CONSTITUTIONAL METHODS OF REGULATING JITNEYS
Not every business or profession is subject to general state regula-
tion. In order to justify such legislation the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare of the public must be involved.' Jitney transportation,
by reason of the number and 4tiality of the machines engaged therein
and of the usual inexperience and financial irresponsibility of their oper-
ators, is a fit subject for the exercise of the police power in the protec-
tion of public safety.2 The only question to be discussed is the extent
and manner of regulation.3 The police power is of indefinite and ever-
increasing magnitude, but subject, nevertheless, to certain rules and lim-
itations, varying according to the character of the matter involved. The
cases are in apparent confusion and there is need for classification and
analysis. Three general groups are possible, the first two of which are
usually recognized.' The third is apparently unappreciated as an addi-
tional classification, but it is submitted that it exists as a distinct group
'Ex parte Hadacheck (1913) 165 Calif. 416, 132 Pac. 584; (1918) 31 HARv.
L. REv. 1034.
2Public Service Commission v. Booth (1915) 17o App. Div. 590, 156 N. Y.
Supp. 140.
'For notes collecting the cases see L. R. A. 1918 F, 475, note.
'See Freund, Police Power (1904) secs. 643-644.
[1831
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by reason of distinctions in the facts of the decisions and that recogni-
tion of it may prove helpful in the solution of a difficult problem.
The first group of cases includes those dealing with occupations
affected with a public interest but not inherently harmful or dangerous.
The regulation imposed upon such occupations must be reasonable and
must tend to reach the result desired.5 The statute may merely pre-
scribe a policy, appointing a commission to make proper rules and to
administer them.6 But the statute cannot allow its whole operation,7 or
the granting and refusal of a license,8 to depend upon the unregulated
discretion of an administrative board. All proceedings before such a
board must be strictly regular,9 a litigant being entitled in all cases to
hear the evidence adduced against him.'
Quite different from the first group just discussed are those cases
involving occupations inherently harmful, or dangerous, to the public if
not properly conducted; in these no citizen is absolutely privileged to
engage." A license to maintain a saloon' 2 or to sell milk' 3 may be
granted and revoked in the discretion of an administrative board. And
summary action may be taken if safety requires it, though at the peril
of the board.'
These two classes are familiar enough. In addition, a third class
exists, in which a private right is claimed in public property, as in a
street or park. It has been customary to group such cases together with
those in which the acts may be prohibited. But they may fairly and
accurately be regarded as of a distinct type. To this type the jitney
problem belongs. The privilege of a citizen to travel upon the highway
and transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and
5State v. Porter (1920) 94 Conn. 639, nio AtI. 59; lngham v. Brooks (1920)
95 Conn. 317, 11I Atl. 209; (1916) i6 CoL. L. Rlv. 345; COMMENTS (1920) 30
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 171.8Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct.
436; State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (igo8) 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969; Cheadle,
Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 892.
SO'Neil v. Fire Insurance Co. (1895) 166 Pa. 72, 30 At. 943; Fite v. State
(905) 114 Tenn. 646, 88 S. W. 94,; State v. Gt. Northern Ry. (I9O7) 1oo
Minn. 445, in N. W. 289.
s Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct IO64; Noble v.
Douglas (1921, W. D. Wash.) 274 Fed. 672.
9 Blunt v. Shepardson (7978) 286 II. 84, 121 N. E. 263; COmmENTS (1919)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 692.
10 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville, etc. Ry. (913) 227 U. S. 88,
33 Sup. Ct 185.
See State v. Conlon (895) 65 Conn. 478, 486, 33 Atl. 519, 521.
Wallace v. Reno (1903) 27 Nev. 71, 73 Pac. 528.
x'Lieberman v. Van De Carr (9o5) 199 U. S. 552, 26 Sup. Ct. i44; but see
COMMENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 391.
14Durand v. Dyson (1915) 277 Ill. 382, 111 N. E. 143.
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business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes
the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain. One is
the usual and ordinary privilege of a citizen, while the other is special,
unusual, and extraordinary. The extent of legislative power on the
former is that of regulation, but the latter may be wholly denied.'
5
And since it may be wholly denied, it may be granted upon any condi-
tions that the legislature deems proper, the reasonableness of the regu-
lation being purely a legislative question.'8
This power may be delegated to municipalities by charter or statute.
17
To be valid," however, local regulations must be reasonable.' It is
another question when the legislature has vested the power to grant
licenses for the use of public places in the discretion of an administra-
tive commission. To require the latter to grant licenses to jitneys when,
in their opinion, the public convenience and necessity require it, is not
an unconstitutional delegation of power.' 9 The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that the mayor of a city may be given absolute
discretion in granting licenses to move buildings over the public
streets,20 and in granting licenses to speak on the public common.
2
'
There are, however, cases which deny this discretionary power to an
official.22  But these involve the right to use the street for parades, and
not for business purposes, and they may be supported on the ground
that the right of persons to assemble and parade is so well established
historically that it can be regulated but not prohibited, or made depend-
ent upon the will of any official.
The Connecticut jitney statute,2 ' though vague and ungrammatical,
2 4
1Ex parte Dickey (1915) 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781; Schoenfeld v. City of
Seattle (192o, W. D. Wash.) 265 Fed. 726.
" Hadfield v. Lundin (1917) 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516; Peters v. San
Antonio (917, Tex. Civ. App.) 195 S. W. 989.
1, City of Memphis v. State (9,5) 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. W. 631; Huston v.
Des Moines (1916) 176 Iowa, 455, 156 N. W. 883; Cummis v. Jones (1916)
79 Or. 276, i55 Pac. 171; McGlothern v. City of Seattle (1921, Wash.) igg Pac.
457.
'Jitney Bus Association v. City of Wilkes-Barre (1917) 256 Pa. 462, IOO AtI.
954; Curry v. Osborne (1918) 75 Fla. 85, 79 So. 293; Parrish 
v. Richmond
(1916) ii Va. i8o, 89 S. E. 102.
" See Public Service Commission v. Booth, supra note 2.
Wilson v. Eureka City (1899) 173 U. S. 32, 19 Sup. Ct 317 (briefly digesting
many cases) ; but see Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero (898) 176 Ill. 9, 5, X. E.
758.
'Davis v. Massachusetts (1897) 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct 73,; contra, State
v. Coleman (1921, Conn.) 113 Atl. 385.
' Matter of Frazee (886) 63 Mich. 396, 3o N. W. 72; For other similar cases
see Freund, op. cit. secs. 643-644.
Pub. Acts, 1921, ch. 77.
" The words of the statute which are important in this connection are as follows:
"Sec. 3. No person .... shall operate a jitney until the owner thereof shall
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has recently been held constitutional in the case of Lane v. Whitaker
(1921, U. S. D. C. Conn.) 65 N. Y. L. JOUR. 149, the court construing
it as requiring the Public Utilities Commission to hold hearings and to
grant licenses if, and whenever, in their opinion, public convenience and
necessity so require. This interpretation, while resting on inference
only, is perhaps justified by the rule that a statute must be construed
so as to be constitutional whenever it is possible to do so. It seems
questionable whether by the wording of the statute this interpretation
was actually justified, especially when it is considered that the provision
for revocation seems not to require a hearing.25 The Supreme Court
of Connecticut has recently held, in State v. Coleman,26 that an unregu-
lated authority to grant licenses to speak in a public park may not be
given to an administrative official. Under the authority of this case, if
it be considered that an unguided discretion is vested in the commission
either to grant or to revoke licenses, then this statute must be held
unconstitutional. And federal courts should take into consideration the
Connecticut authorities when passing on the constitutionality of a Con-
necticut statute. On the other hand, the doctrine of the Federal
have obtained a certificate from the Public Utilities Commission specifying the
route .... and that the public convenience and necessity require its operation over
such route ...... Upon receipt of .... application said commission shall fix a
time and place of hearing thereon .... and public hearing held thereon. (note
that this clause has no grammatical connection with what precedes it) .... The
commission may amend or revoke any certificate." "Sec. 7. Any person ....
aggrieved by any act or order of the .... commission may appeal to the Superior
Court in the same manner and with the same effect" as is provided in Rev. Sts.
1918, sec. 3828.
' On this point, however, the section providing for an appeal may have a con-
siderable bearing, for it seems probable that, in providing for an appeal, the legis-
lature must have intended the commission to hold hearings. The court, ih the
instant case, seems to have considered this section as a general panacea. But it
is submitted that, outside of its influence upon the interpretation of the statute, it
has no effect whatever. While its words seem to indicate that the case, on appeal,
shall be transferred bodily to the Superior Court, and the judge of that court
vested with the same discretion as was given the Commission, still, its operation is
otherwise, for it has been held that, where administrative questions are involved,
the Superior -Court may not try the question de novo, but must first be satisfied by
the appellant that the commissioners acted irregularly. Stevens v. Connecticut
Co. (1912) 86 Conn. 36, 84 Atl. 361. This is the rule even when no appeal is
expressly given. The courts cannot review the discretion which has by law been
vested in an administrative board. State v. Board of Dental Examiners (19o5)
38 Wash. 325, 80 Pac. 544. But they can interfere if an application is arbitrarily
rejected without reason given (Amperse v. City of Kalamazoo (1886) 59 Mich.
78, 26 N. W. 222); or if the discretion is clearly shown to have been abused.
Board of Dental Examiners v. People (1887) 123 Ill. 227, 13 N. E. 201; Thomp-
son v. Koch (1895) 98 Ky. 400, 33 S. W. 96. An express statutory decliration
that the decisions of the board shall be final violates due process. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota (189o) 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 702.
" Supra note 21.
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Supreme Court cases already referred to,27 if carried to its logical con-
clusion, would sustain the statute. In connection with the Coleman case
it will be noted that the authority upon which the court relied included
only cases which belong to the group of ordinary enterprises mentioned
above as class one and which, it is believed, therefore, were not control-
ling. While the case may appeal to one's sense of justice, nevertheless,
it is submitted that this is a legislative, and not a judicial question, for
there can be no property right in the use of a public place for private
gain.
2 8
TARDY PRESENTATION OF CHECKS BY SENDING FROM PAYEE'S
BRANCH TO HEAD OFFICE
The present danger of bank failures should draw attention to an
interesting variation of the "stale check rule" recently discussed in
Republic Metalware Co. v. Smith (i92O) 218 Ill. App. 130. Ordi-
narily, one receiving a check drawn on a bank in the same city, if he
would preserve his .rights against the drawer in case the bank fails,
must present the check for payment not later than the following business
day,1 twenty-four hours being considered a reasonable time. But what
constitutes a reasonable time when paper is originally sent to more
distant points is less easy to settle and in consequence not so certainly
established.2
", Supra notes 20 and 21.
'*LeBlanc v. City, of New Orleans (1915) 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212.
SGrange v. Reigh (1896) 93 Wis. 552, 67 N. W. 1130; Gordon v. Levine
(1907) 194 Mass. 418, 8o N. E. 505. Few checks are now presented by the payee,
but they are generally deposited in his own bank. And since the great bulk of
city checks are collected through clearing houses, a method n6w legally recognized,
one wonders whether a special rule of reasonableness should not be applied,
allowing an extra day in the case where the payee, receiving a check too late to
deposit it the same day, deposits it the next, and it is presented through the clearing
house the day after. This is the rule of Loux v. Fox (1895) 171 Pa. 68, 33 Atl.
i9o; Cf. contra, Edinisten v. Herpolsheinzer (igoi) 66 Neb. 94, 92 N. W. i38,
Sedgwick, J., dissenting in a vigorous opinion. See also Willis v. Finley (1896)
173 Pa. 28, 34 Atl. 213; Dorchester v. Merchants Nat. Bk. (1914) 1o6 Tex. 261,
163 S. W. 5; Holmes v. Roe (1886) 62 Mich. 199, 204, 28 N. W. 864, 866 (inti-
mating that clearing house methods are without bearing on cases) ; Alexander v.
Burchfield (1842, C. P.) 7 Man. & G. io6i, lO67 (no extra day for passing
through bankers); Zaloomn v. Ganim (1911, Sup. Ct.) 72 Misc. 36, 129 N. Y.
Supp. 85, Delany, J., dissenting, affirmed without opinion (1911) 148 App. Div.
892, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1151. Why the court in the last case entered upon a learned
historical discussion of clearing houses and their methods can only be imagined,
for the evidence conclusively shows (case on appeal, folio 76) that the check did
not go through the clearing house but was presented for payment over the counter
by the old method employed before clearing houses were known.
'See Cent. Dig. tit. Bills and Notes, secs. 1095-1o97. The "next day" rule
applied to each step in the transaction is standard and seems to have general accep-
tance. See First National Bank of Grafton v. Buckhannon Bank (1895) 8o M&
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The instant case savors somewhat of both the local payment type and
the distant remittance type. The plaintiff, a Buffalo manufacturing
company, maintained a sales office in Chicago and from it sold.goods to
the defendant, who always remitted his check on his Chicago bankers
to the local office, despite a printed request on each invoice, unnoticed
by the defendant, to make payments direct to Buffalo headquarters.
The plaintiff kept a Chicago bank account for local expenditures, in
which also were deposited cash payments for merchandise sold by that
office, but check payments, when sent contrary to request, like the
defendant's, were forwarded instead to Buffalo headquarters and there
deposited for collection. The defendant's check, in consequence of
being so handled, was presented to the drawee bankers for payment
after they had closed their doors, June 29, 1917. It is conceded that
the check would have been presented in time and paid if collected
through the plaintiff's depository. There is no question but that the
plaintiff acted quickly in each step of the course it took,--forwardinig,
depositing, collecting-but the court held that the course of collection
was not duly diligent. The drawer was discharged.3 Dispensing with
collateral arguments that enter the decision, such for example, as the
waiver by the plaintiff of its right to have payments made at Buffalo
by its having received them at Chicago, and considering the case as if
this had been the first remittance from the defendant to the plaintiff,
the following propositions are clear: (i) if the defendant had himself
sent his check to Buffalo he would have remained liable, because the
collection from Buffalo was prompt and direct; (2) if, on the other
hand, the plaintiff had been a Chicago concern which had for any cause
chosen to collect through a Buffalo bank, the defendant would have
been discharged upon the failure of his bankers, because routing checks
to Buffalo would have been circuitous, and not reasonably diligent.4
475, 480, 31 Ati. 302, 303; Dorchester v. Merchants' Nat. Batk of Houston (1914)
io6 Tex. 201, 209, 163 S. W. 5, 8; Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie (19o6) 135
Iowa, 685, 687, i1O N. W. 29, 30. The last case, however, countenances the circu-
lation of checks. The "next day" rule should be straightened in one place. It
seems only right to demand that banks intermediate in the chain of collection-that
is, those which must send the check on by mail to another place-should mail the
paper on the day it is received, unless after the close of regular banking hours.
See Givan v. Bank of Alexandria (1898, Tenn. Ch. App.) 52 S. W. 923. Many
of the great collecting banks have, as a matter of practice, done even better than
this by the maintenance of sleepless transit departments. Certainly the reasoning
advanced by Story, J., for the "next day" rule in the matter of giving notice of
dishonor-that one "is not compellable to lay aside all other business" in order
to give such notice the same day (quoted in the Hubbard Case, infra, note 4), is
equal ground for a "next day" rule in collections-has no application to banks
whose very business that is.
'To the extent of his loss. See note 8, infra.
'On sending a check away from, or across, the place of payment instead of toward
or to it, see Gifford v. Hardell (1894) 88 Wis. 538, 6o N. W. 1964. So too,
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The case introduces, however, the additional factor of branch offices
and agencies and the question is really whether the time consumed by
a branch office or agent in forwarding customers' checks to the head
office is to be added in the calculation of the reasonable time for
presentment.
Cases on this point are neither numerous, harmonious, nor helpful.
In one old English case,5 where a cotton buyer, as agent of a seller, had
gone to the house of a salesman and had there paid an account by check
on Liverpool (probably to the order of the sellers), it was held that the
time for the salesman to deliver the check to his principals, the sellers,
was a part of the reasonable time to transpire before presentation.
But this established no general rule, for, as the court said, "It is clear
that the defendant never intended that Kershaw (the salesman) should
do more than take it to his master on the following morning." The
payment was as if made the next day to the principals. Two early
American cases6 add little, for in each the check was drawn to the order
of the agent.
sending a check for deposit to the opposite side of the same city has been considered
laches,-a sound enough view as to outlying banks, not members of the clearing
house, but miles apart and standing to each other as distant points despite their
inclusion within the corporate limits of one municipality. Nat. Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Stevenson (1!18) 213 Ill. App. 49. Collections must not be
unduly circuitous, but they need not be literally "direct," as confusedly intimated
in some cases. The true rule is instantly grasped from the remark of Dibell, J.,
in Sublette Exch. Bank v. Fitzgerald (1912) 168 Ill. App. 24o, 242: "By
requiring that the check be forwarded directly to the bank upon which it is drawn,
the rule above stated does not mean that it shall be sent in a direct line as a bird
might fly, but by the usual commercial route. . . ." This permits a certain amount
of evidence as to the custom of banks in collecting items (see Watt v. Gans
(1896) 114 Ala. 264, 271, 21 So. 1o1, 1013) of which, in a general way, deposi-
tors must be expected to know. See Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery
Supply Co. (19o6) 59 W. Va. 75, 88, 52 S. E. 17, 1022. Collections between
small places pass through key cities-collection centers. This custom could be
shown as indicating what was commercially direct. Of course the absurd routes
followed by some checks to avoid exchange charges could not be justified on the
ground that such routing was customary,--which it certainly has been. The
national clearing houses, such as those of Boston and St. Louis, and of late the
Federal Reserve System, diminish this practice, so that the point becomes con-
stantly less important, and it may be that as the Federal Reserve collection system
sweeps in all the banks, its routing will be "presumed" free from unreasonable
circuity.
'Firth v. Brooks (i861, Q. B.) 4 L. T. R. 467, 468.
'Hazelton v. Colburn (1863) 24 N. Y. Super. Ct. 345; Nat. Newark Banking
Co. v. Ind. Nat. Bank of Erie (1869) 63 Pa. 404. The cases are otherwise dis-
tinguishable; that in Pennsylvania concerned a bank draft, as to which "the rule
of diligence is much more liberal." Campbell, 3., in Nutting v. Burked (1882)
48 Mich. 241, 245. In the New York case the court said: "The circumstance that
the payees of the check were the agents of the plaintiffs, did not authorize them
to withhold the presentment" (P. 349). If this is so, what of attorneys who
receive checks to their own order and forward them endorsed to their clients?
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A later case7 involved a state of facts similar in many ways to those of
the principal case. The branch office to which the check was sent was
in New York City, and the head office to which it was forwarded was
in Germantown, Pennsylvania. The check was presented for payment
to the New York bankers, on whom it was drawn, without delay except
that involved in the Pennsylvania detour, and payment was refused.
The court, by dictum," characterized the transaction as duly diligent,
but no reasoning appears. It may well be doubted whether, if the head
office had been a far distant point (such as San Francisco) instead of
one nearby, such a rule would have been laid down.
Two other cases 9 have recognized the time involved for a collecting
agent to place the customer's check in the hands of the principal as a
proper part of the period of diligent collection. But in each case pay-
ment was made to a travelling representative, who can hardly be placed
in the sable legal category as a branch office so far as the reasonably
assumed power of collecting the company's paper is concerned.' 0 They
may then be classed with the English case first cited.'
There remains one other case 2 which the instant court considers and
distinguishes. The major difference seems to be that the local "office"
was nothing but a local warehouse from which deliveries were made.
The conclusion reached, that forwarding checks from branch to head-
quarters constitutes sufficient diligence, is contrary to that of the princi-
pal case and can probably be best explained and differentiated by
emphasizing the unauthoritative character of the local office. Certainly
the reasons given, that the remitter knew he was dealing with a for-
eign corporation' 3 and also knew how long checks sent to headquarters
Allen v. Kramer (1878) 2 Ill App. 205.
'Dictum only, because the check actually reached the drawee New York bankers
before they failed and payment was refused because of doubt as to the drawer's
signature,-a reason for non-payment which would have been the same had the
check not gone to Pennsylvania. The negligence of the payee, if any there was,
did not occasion the drawer's loss, essential to the drawer's discharge. Norton,
Bills & Notes ( 4 th ed. 1914) 577; Daniels v. Kyle (1846) 1 Ga. s04-
'Rosenthal v. Ehrlicher (1893) 154 Pa. 396, 26 AtI. 435; Lewis Hubbard &
Co. v. Montgomery, supra note 4.
0 See, however, on the occasional power given collectors of going to the drawee
banks themselves and receiving cash or bank drafts in exchange for customers'
checks, Swift & Co. v. Miller (1916) 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N. E. 447; Rosenthal
v. Ehrlicher, supra note 9.
"See note 5 supra.
Balkwill v. Bridgeport Wood Finishing Co. (1895) 62 Ill. App. 663.
13 The weakness of this as a controlling element is evident when the present
fashion of incorporating in states far from the real headquarters of the company
is considered. Furthermore, even .if the corporation was "foreign" also as to its
real business location, there is nothing to prevent its branches being vested with
power to receive and deal with payments. It is in fact a matter of common
knowledge that they do so.
COMMENTS
took for collection,'1 4 are neither convincing nor satisfactory. The
usual transaction starts and finishes with the local office, whether the
customer is observant and knows there is a main office somewhere else,
or whether he is unobservant and fails to appreciate that fact.
Although arbitrary or mechanical rules of reasonableness are undesir-
able in such cases,'5 the result reached in the principal case seems sound.
In the absence of strong evidence to warrant another conclusion, when
an office, whether known as a branch or not, is vested with general
selling authority and has the apparent power to make collections, it
may be expected by persons dealing with it to have proper collecting
facilities which will be utilized for the expeditious presentation of
paper drawn in its sales territory. Before regarding the rule as
soundly established, however, the actual business purpose of the "send-
checks-to-headquarters" practice should be considered.' Such legal
questions cannot be answered satisfactorily without a consideration of
the business reasons underlying the practice. It is a device to prevent
losses from the juggling of large local sales revenues by dishonest
local sales managers.' 6 But while thus preventing one loss, it makes
possible another when bank failures occur. Perhaps bank failures are
less common, however, than sales managers who play the races, the
wheat pit, or the stock market. A possible solution is to place the
responsibility upon the bank carrying the local sales deposits by limit-
ing the checking privileges of the local sales manager. Between the
drawer and the selling house, any risk incident to protecting the latter
from the possible crime of its agent belongs to the party protected.
M. BRECKENRIDGE.
New York City.
RENVOI IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS BASED UPON CONSTRUCTIVE
SERVICE
That the "renvoi doctrine" furnishes no proper basis for the solu-
tion of the problems in the conflict of laws in general admits of little
doubt.' As the term is generally understood, it means that when a
4 Whether this information was thought to have been gained from an examina-
tion of the endorsements on his cancelled checks previously paid to the same
company does not appear. The principal case correctly declares that there is no
duty on the part of a drawer of checks to make such an examination.
" Many cases, including the principal case, take the precaution to state that they
are decided on all the facts. Note the language of the trial Judge quoted in the
Newark Case, supra note 6.
" See First Nat. Bank of Phila. v. Farrell (1921, W. D. Pa.) 272 Fed. 371.
'Pollock, The Renvoi in New York (1920) 36 L. QUART. Rlv. 92; Baty,
Polarized Law (1914) 117; Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application
of Foreign Law (igio) io CoL. L. Rxv. 190, 327; The Renvoi Doctrine in the
Conflict of Laws (1918) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAI, 509.
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court is to apply the law of some other state or country, it must consult
not only the particular provisions relating to the matter in issue, but
also the rules of the conflict of laws governing in that state or country.
For example, if the question relates to the distribution of, personal
property upon death, the acceptance of the "renvoi doctrine" signifies
that the property will not necessarily be distributed according to the
statute of distributions of the state or country in which the decedent was
domiciled at the time of his death, for if his domicil was in a state or
country in which the rule of the lex patriae has been substituted for
that of the lex domicilii, the rights of the parties would be determined
by the statute of distributions of the decedent's national law. Again,
if the law of the forum provides that capacity to enter into a commer-
cial contract shall be controlled by the law of the place of contracting
and the conflict of laws of the lex loci should prescribe the lex domi-
cilii or the lex patriae, the validity of the contract would be governed
by the local rules relating to capacity existing in the state in which the
party in question had his domicil or to which he belonged by nation-
ality. If the law of the forum says that the validity of a contract,
apart from capacity and formalities, is to be subject to the law of the
place of performance and the rule of the conflict of laws of the state or
country in which the performance is to take place says that the law of
the place of contracting controls, the validity or invalidity of the con-
tract would depend upon the law of contracts of the place where the
contract was entered into.
Illustrations of the same problem could easily be multiplied in view
of the fact that the rules of the conflict of laws of the various countries
differ as regards most questions that may arise in this branch of the
law. It must suffice here to call attention to the fact that the "renvoi
doctrine" effects in every instance a substitution of the foreign rule of
the conflict of laws for that prescribed in the first place by the law of
the forum.2  A mere statement of the operation of the "renvoi doc-
trine" should be sufficient to condemn it. The policy which guides our
courts when they apply the law of domicil, the law of the contract, or
any other rule of the conflict of laws, must manifestly be determined
by our own law and cannot reasonably be left to the judgment of a
foreign legislator." This has also been the conclusion of the only
decision, by an English or American court, in which the problem of
renvoi was clearly presented.4 It would be well for the future develop-
"For a court to hold that the legislature meant that the French conflict of laws
rule is to apply and New York internal law to be enforced is to abrogate this
provision of the statute, or to amend it by substituting therefor the French rule,
namely, that the law of the nationality is to govern." In re Tallmadge (i919)
62 N. Y. L. JouR. 216; COMMENTS (1919) 2!9 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 214.
' Baty, op. cit. 117; Lorenzen, op. cit. 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 509, 519-520.
'In re Talnadge, supra note 2; COMMENTS (igig) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
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ment of our rules of the conflict of laws if every court in this country
would subscribe to the following words, pronounced by the learned
Referee in the case referred to :5
"On account of its inconsistency with common-law theories of the
conflict of laws, its fundamental unsoundness and the chaos which
would result from its application to the conflicts arising between the
laws of the states of this country it is my opinion that the 'renvoi' has
no place in our jurisprudence."
Of course it does not follow that some exceptions may not have to
be recognized to the fundamental doctrine that the rules of the conflict
of laws call for the application of the foreign local law, to the exclu-
sion of its rules of the conflict of laws. In some instances a desirable
result may be attained by referring to the foreign law inclusive of its
rules of the conflict of laws. A clear case is presented, for example, in
the matter of the execution of a deed. Suppose that a deed is executed
and acknowledged in the style customary at the place of execution, that
it does not satisfy the formal requirements for deeds executed in the
state in which the property is situated, but that the law of the latter
state authorizes deeds to be executed in the mode prescribed by the law
of the place of execution. Such a deed must certainly be regarded as
valid everywhere, even apart from constitutional requirements, and yet
this cannot be done without giving effect to a rule of the conflict of
laws of the situs.6
A recent case, Ball v. Cross (1921) 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. Io 6 ,
decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, has raised the question
whether the "renvoi doctrine" should be recognized, by way of excep-
tion, with regard to divorce also. Suppose that A and B are domi-
ciled in the State of X, that A leaves his wife and procures a divorce
from B in the state of Y upon constructive service, and that B there-
after marries, in the state of Z, a citizen of New York, C. Can C have
the marriage annulled in New York on the ground that B was never
properly divorced from her first husband? Let us assume for the pur-
214. The renvoi doctrine was argued also before Mr. Justice Farwell in the case
of In re Johnson [i9o3] i Ch. 821, but it was not squarely presented, as it was to
no one's interest to contend that the local law of Baden should govern as the lex
domicilii, and it is not possible to say, therefore, what conclusion Mr. Justice
Farwell would otherwise have arrived at. See NoTEs (1903) 19 L. QuART.
REv. 245; Pollock, op. cit. 36 L. QuART. Rav. 92.
'In re Talnadge, supra note 2.
'The rule of the situs that a deed may be executed in the form prescribed by
the local law of the place of execution is clearly a rule of the conflict of laws, for
it gives only a general reference to the law of another state and does not prescribe
the exact mode of execution. If it had provided that all deeds relating to domes-
tic land executed without the state must satisfy a certain definite form prescribed
by it the provision would have been an internal one and not a rule of the conflict
of laws.
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pose of our discussion that the New York courts have jurisdiction to
annul the marriage.7 Will the New York courts recognize that the
divorce decree "of the State of Y was operative in New York with
respect to B? If B had been a citizen of New York at the time of the
divorce proceedings, the established policy of New York, based upon
a desire "to promote the permanency of marriage contracts and the
morality of the citizens of the state,"8 would have been opposed to the
recognition of the decree.9 What attitude should be taken, however,
where B was, at the time of the divorce, a citizen of another state?
Two ways were open before the court. It could say that the policy of
New York with reference to the non-recognition of a divorce upon
constructive service, pronounced by a court other than that of the
matrimonial domicil,'0 was limited to New York citizens and that such
a decree would be recognized with respect to citizens of another state.
In so doing effect might be given to the foreign decree of divorce when
it would have none in the state in which the party was domiciled. Or
it could hold, as it did in the instant case, that the validity or invalidity
of the decree with reference to B should be left to the determination of
the state of which B was a citizen at the time of the divorce proceed-
ings. The latter course involves an acceptance of renvoi, for it adopts
the policy of the lex domicilii et patriae in the matter of the conflict of
laws as regards the recognition or non-recognition of a foreign decree
of divorce based upon constructive service.
The advantage of the position taken by the New York Court of
Appeals is that if all courts follow its example, foreign decrees of
divorce rendered upon constructive service would have, with respect to
the party so served, the same effect in all jurisdictions, a result which
in the actual state of the law cannot be attained if the law of the forum
decides its own policy without regard to the policy of the state of
which the party in question was a citizen. The recognition of renvoi
in this class of cases may bring with it, however, considerable incon-
venience where the parties are foreigners. If the national law of the
party served constructively is to determine the validity of the divorce
with respect to such party, our courts will frequently be called upon to
apply the rules of the conflict of laws applicable to foreign divorce pro-
ceedings obtaining in foreign countries, a task beset with no little dif-
ficulty.' - The embarrassment so caused may be reduced, however, to
" See Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage (igig) 32 HA1 v. L. Rv. 8o6.
'Hubbard v. Hubbard (1920) .228 N. Y. 8I, 126 N. E. gig.
'People v. Baker (1879) 76 N. Y. 78; Ohmsted v. Olnsted (19o8) 19o N. Y.
458, 83 N. E. 569.
" A decree pronounced upon constructive service by the courts of the matrimonial
domicil must be recognized by all other courts under the "full faith and credit"
clause of the Federal Constitution. Atherton v. Atherton (igoi) 181 U. S. 155,
21 Sup. Ct. 544; Thompson v. Thompson (1913) 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129.
' For the rules of the conflict of laws governing the recognition of foreign
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a considerable extent, if the criterion of domicil is substituted for that
of nationality in this class of cases, as well it might be, for the policy
of a state in the matter of divorce extends equally to all persons domi-
ciled within the state, irrespective of citizenship. As the number of
cases in our courts in which the defendant in a di-'orce proceeding is
domiciled in a foreign country must be relatively few, the incon-
venience that may arise from the application of the law of the domicil,
inclusive of its rules of the conflict of laws, would appear to be
negligible.
E. G. L.
TITLE BY INNOCENT MISTAKEN OCCUPATION
If a man occupies land to a certain boundary, mistakenly thinking that
all the land is his when in fact part of it is an extension beyond his true
line, and if he so occupies the extension for more than the period pre-
scribed in the statute of limitations, does he gain title thereto by adverse
possession? There is some real and much apparent conflict in the
answer to this question by American state courts.
Take a case of such occupation arising from pure, unsuspected mis-
take, unaccompanied by any doubt in the occupier's mind that the
boundary to which he occupies is in fact the true boundary.' It is evi-
dent that in such circumstances th intention and claim of the possessor
to the strip of land beyond the true boundary are precisely those with
respect to all the rest of the land, which is truly his. This conclusion
as to the nature of his intent and claim follows from the fact that he is
holding to the boundary as the result of unsuspected mistake. For
how can it be said that one who is occupying land under the impression
that it is his own occupies it with a frame of mind different from that
of an owner? If an owner's possession of his own land is hostile to all
the world, in the sense that it is unaccompanied by any recognition of
right in others,2 it surely follows that the possession of a man who
divorce in France, Germany, and Italy, see Lorenzen, Cases on the Conflict of
Laws (I9o9) 564, 565.1 Hopkins v. Duggar (1920) 204 Ala. 626, 87 So. 103.
In Tiffany, Reql Property (192o ed.) the author identifies hostility of posses-
sion with claim of title. He says at p. 1936: "It has been asserted, by perhaps
most of the courts in this country, that, in order that the statute of limitations may
run in favor of one in possession of land, the possession must be under claim of
right or title. There would seem reason to doubt, however, whether in asserting
this requirement, the courts ordinarily have in mind anything more than a restate-
ment of the requirement of hostility of possession." As to what constitutes hos-
tility, the same author says, at p. 1931, that a possession is hostile to a true owner,
"when it is unaccompanied by any recognition, expressed or inferable from circum-
stances, of the right in the latter. It does not involve the necessity of an express
denial of the title of the true owner, and, it is evident, in the majority of cases there
is no such denial."
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thinks he is owner is in fact also hostile, to the same dezree and for the
same reasons, as in the case of a true title holder. The rightful owner
of land can subjectively do no more than think of himself as such and
intend to claim and occupy as such; and the innocent mistaken occupier,
by virtue of his mistake, has just the same frame of mind. In such a
case it would seem fitting to say that the latter occupier's claim was
hostile to the rest of the world, including the rightful owner, in such a
way as to make his possession adverse.8
It may be objected that there is no intention on the part of the occu-
pier to make a claim hostile to the rightful owner. This is true in the
sense that there is no such intention with respect to a known or sus-
pected rightful owner,--the mere fact that the occupation is by pure
mistake precluding any possibility of there being a possession hostile
to such a consciously considered individual. But there is a conscious
claim hostile to the whole world including the rightful owner,--in his
capacity as a member of the general community. Should the sole fact
that the true owner is unrecognized as such and his existence unsus-
pected be reason for saying that the occupation is not hostile to him?
The better answer seems to be that the possession is hostile to the true
owner,4 in quite the same sense that it is hostile to all others,--no more,
no less. It follows that an oral claim-as distinct from an assertion by
acts-of exclusive dominion over the strip beyond the true boundary
should not be essential to establish a hostile possession 5 ; one does not
expect such an oral claim from a rightful owner of land; neither
should it be expected from one who by mistake holds land with pre-
cisely the same frame of mind as that of a rightful owner.
Nevertheless some courts answer the question by saying that the
possession is not sufficiently hostile to the true owner to make the pos-
session adverse.6 In the recent case of Kinne v. Waggoner (1921,
'Moir v. Bailey (1920) 146 Ark. 347, 225 S. W. 618; Hopkins v. Duggar, supra
note i; Carpenter v. Rose (192o) 186 Ky. 686, 217 S. W. 009; Anderson v.
Richards .(19i2, Or.) 198 Pac. 570. The last case specifically lays down the rule
for cases of mistake; though it does not certainly appear upon the facts as reported
that there was necessarily a mistake in the case at bar. The rule may be only
dictum here, though it is unquestionably the rule of the state. French v. Pearce
(1831) 8 Conn. 439, is a leading case in support of this view.
'Alverson v. Hooper (1919) io8 Wash. 5IO, 185 Pac. 8o8; Heinrichs v. Polking
(1919) 185 Ky. 433, 215 S. W. 179. In this case evidence of agreement might
perhaps have been found; but, as it stands on the language of the court, it is a
square decision upon the point under inquiry. Pfeifer v. Scottsbluff Mortgage
Loan Co. (i92I,. Neb.) I81 N. W. 533. See also Blackburn v. Coffee (1920)
142 Ark. 426, 218 S. W. 836. In this case there may have been doubt in the
parties' minds as to the line; and consequently not a pure mistake of boundary.
'Cassidy v. Lenahan (1920) 294 Il1. 503, 128 N. E. 544-
'Kinne v. Waggoner (1921, Kan.) 197 Pac. 195. There is a good collection
of cases on this point-and others-in the note to Edwards v. Fleming (911)
83 Kan. 653, 112 Pac. 836, in 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 923 et seq.; cf. Long v. Myers
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Kan.) 197 Pac. 195, the defendants had for more than forty years
notoriously occupied to a fence which both they- and the plaintiffs had
mistakenly believed to coincide with the true boundary. The court
held that since the original location of the fence was by mistake, there
was no basis for adverse possession, saying that the intention to claim
and hold adversely was wanting.7 But might it not be better to say
that although it was wanting against a consciously recognized owner, it
was present against that owner as an unknown, unisolated member of
the general community?
It would seem reasonable in cases of mistaken boundary, as in other
cases of possession of real property induced by mistake, to give more
weight to the actual possession by the occupier than to the mistake that
was its cause. No one would maintain that because one occupied land
under a deed which was mistakenly believed to be valid, the occupation
was therefore not hostile, to the rightful owner., There is only a
superficial distinction between such a case and that of occupation under
a mistake as to the boundary. In both cases the occupation is innocent;
in both the occupier has acted upon an unsuspected error of fact; in
(1921, Kan.) 198 Pac. 934. Bradstreet v. Winter (1920) iig Me. 30, io9 AtI.
482 looks like a decision on the point under inquiry, though it may have been
decided on the ground that possession for the entire statutory period was not
sufficiently notorious. Phelps v. Brevoort (1919) 2o7 Mich. 429, 174 N. W. 281
is an interesting case. The defendant's grantor in 1897 sold part of his tract of
land, lot i, retaining the remainder, lot 2. This sale was made to the plaintiff's
predecessors in title. In 1898 one H, holding lot 2 under the defendants grantor,
built a fence several feet over upon plaintiff's lot i, being in error as to the true
line. In 19oo defendant's grantor leased lot 2 to S, describing it and lot I correctly,
as to their true bounds. The fence then existed, however, and all parties, from 1898
on, looked upon its location as the true line. It was held that since the defendant's
grantor in occupying the strip did not do so under any specific, definite agreement
with the neighboring owners. and since there was never doubt or controversy as to
the true line, but merely mistake, the defendant, who had been benefited by the
erroneous location of the dividing line-and here all parties were in pure error-
might not profit permanently by the mistake, and had no title by adverse possession.
It will be observed that the court made no point, as did the trial court, of the fact
that the defendant's predecessor was the grantor of the land that he subsequently
occupied adversely. This case, both on the facts and decision, is squarely opposed
to Moir v. Bailey, supra note 3, where the adverse occupier was a grantor by deed
of the land he continued to occupy.
"The court points out that the defendants might have gained title had they and
the plaintiffs agreed, regardless of the true boundary line, to treat the fence as the
boundary. But where both parties were mistaken as to the true line, rather than
regardless of it, both believing the fence to coincide with it, title by adverse posses-
sion was not acquired.
82 Tiffany, op. cit. 1949; "In no case except in that of a mistake as to boundary
has the element of mistake been regarded as of any significance, and there is no
reason for attributing greater weight thereto when the mistake is as to the proper
location of a boundary than when it is a mistake as to the title to all the land
wrongfully possessed."
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both there is the same notice of disseisin. Further, it is generally
admitted that the statutes of limitation perfect a defective title in one
who with knowledge, or at least with suspicion, of his own wrong has
occupied another's land to a definite boundary for more than the stat-
utory period.9 It is then just that such statutes should be considered
equally to perfect the defective title in one who innocently occupies
another's land. In either case there is the same hostility to the world at
large. Why should the innocent occupant of another's land be
regarded with less favor than a conscious wrongdoer?
DAMAGES IN FOREIGN CURRENCY
In times of depreciated and fluctuating currencies the determination
of the date governing the rate of exchange becomes important when-
ever damages are assessed in a foreign currency. In any case where
one or more of the operative facts occurred without the territorial
limits of the forum, many questions may arise as to the legal conse-
quences to be attached to those facts by the law of the forum.' But
assuming that damages have been properly assessed, what is the date
upon which the rate of exchange shall be taken for the purpose of
computing the damages in the currency of the forum.2  A classification
of the cases with reference to their operative facts may aid in the solu-
tion of this rather novel and perplexing problem.
The question arose from a tort action in the recent case of Owners of
S. S. Celia v. Owners of S. S. Volturno (I92I, H. L.) 37 T. L. R. 969.
Due to the defendant's negligence, a collision occurred in which the
plaintiff's ship was damaged. The collision occurred on December 17,
1917; the ship was detained for temporary repairs at Gibraltar from
December 25, to December 30, 1917, and for permanent repairs at New-
port News from January 24 to February I8, 1918. A part of the
plaintiff's loss was due to the fact that the vessel was at all of these dates
under hire to the Italian Ministry of Marine, and the plaintiffs received
no pay therefor during the periods of detention for repairs. The dam-
ages were assessed in Italian lire and, for .the purpose of entering judg-
ment in English currency, it was held that they should be converted at
'Ibid. I94O. Tiffany, in discussing the question of necessity of claim of title
so that the statute may run, refers to ".... the general acceptance of the view
that, in the absence of an express statutory requirement to that effect, the statute
will run regardless of whether the wrongful possession was taken under a bona fide
claim of right." An interesting case in point is Virginia Midland Ry. v. Barbour
(1899) 97 Va. 118, 33 S. E. 554.
On theory the forum has the powver to attach any legal consequences it sees fit.
See Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualificatiows and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20
CoL. L. REV. 268-28o.
2 "The court has only jurisdiction to award damages in English money" Di
Ferdinando v. Simon, Sinits & Co. [192o, C. A.] 3 K. B. 409, 412; see Marburg v.
Marburg (i866) 26 Md. 8, 21.
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the rate prevailing at "the time when the actual loss for each detention
was incurred."3  While the majority opinion suggests that, in cases of
contract or tort, the rate of exchange decided upon should be the rate at
the time of loss by "breach or in consequence of the wrong,"4 the gen-
eral discussion, and most of the cases cited as controlling, point to the
date of breach of duty as the proper date. But if this date is meant,
the instant case is inconsistent, for the collision-and hence the defend-
ant's breach of duty-occurred sometime before the periods of deten-
tion. If the periods of detention are meant as the only possible date,
then what disposition should be made of cases where there is either no
detention or where the detention extends over a long period of time,
during which the rate fluctuates?
Another class of cases in which the problem arises is where the dam-
ages allowed for the dishonor of negotiable paper are assessed in a
foreign currency. The early cases are not in agreement.5  The cur-
rent decisions generally hold that the owner of a dishonored bill is
entitled, besides interest and charges, to an amount in the currency of
the forum which will purchase a good bill drawn in the foreign cur-
rency at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of dishonor,-
denominated "re-exchange." There may be situations, howeer,
' Few cases have arisen in tort where the damages are assessed in a foreign
currency. In The Verdi (I92O, S. D. N. Y.) 268 Fed. 9o8, the plaintiff's vessel
was injured in New York Harbor in September, 1915. Permanent repairs were
made in England and paid for in January, 1916. Held, that the latter date was the
proper one for computing the rate of exchange. This is a somewhat different date
from that laid down in the principal case. Cf. The Hurona (1920, S. D. N. Y.)
268 Fed. 91o, where the same judge held, in an action to recover a loan, that the
rate existing at,the date of judgment was the proper one.
' See instant case at page 97o. The dissenting judge (Lord Carson) argues
for the date of judgment as proper. Ibid. 972. The lira having fallen so much
in value, manifestly, if the rate be computed as of this date, the plaintiff would
not be adequately compensated; for the theory of damages is that the plaintiff
should, so far as money can do so, be placed as nearly as possible in the same
position that he would have been in had the defendant not failed to perform his
duty. See Sedgwick, Damages (2d ed. 19o9) I5; Roscoe, Damages in Maritime
Collisions (1909) 4; Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co. [1911, P. C.] A. C. 3Ol,
307.
' In New York the plaintiff was formerly allowed, according to a custom of
merchants, to recover the face of a bill at the rate prevailing at the time of
dishonor, together with twenty per cent damages and interest. Graves v. Dash
(1814, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 12 John. 17. In Massachusetts he was allowed :en per
cent. Grim-shaw v. Bender (18og) 6 Mass. 157; cf. the recent case of Amner.
Express Co. v. Cos nopolitan Trust Co. (192I, Mass.) I32 N. E. 26; see 2
Daniel, Negotiable Instronents (6th ed. 1913) sec. 1438; in Taan v. LeGaux
(793, Pa.) i Yeates, 204, the rate existing at the time of judgment was held
proper.
'Simonoff v. Granite City Nat. Bank (1917) 279 Ill. 248, 116 N. E. 636;
Pavenstedt v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1911) 203 N. Y. 91, 96 N. E. iO4;
Gross v. Mendel (1916) 171 App. Div. 237, 157 N. Y. Supp. 357; Suse v.
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where subsequent to the date of dishonor the exchange has gone against
the plaintiff and he thereby suffers loss.7
A third situation is where the duty violated by the defendant does
not arise out of contract or tort.8 In practically all cases of this kind
the date when the defendant should have performed is considered the
proper one for taking the rate of exchange. In most of them, too, the
rate is favorable to the plaintiff; and one might well inquire whether
the courts would stand by the rule if the converse of this were true."
When the defendant has broken his contract (negotiable paper not
being involved) and the damages are assessed in a foreign currency,
the authorities are not in accord. Some apply the date of breach,10
others the date of judgment,". a few the date of trial. 2  If any of these
dates is considered as the only possible one, it is easy to think of situa-
tions in which the plaintiff would be put either in a much better position
than he would have been in had the contract been performed, or else in
a much worse position. There is a seeming injustice in either of these
results.
It is interesting to note, however, that, in most of the cases in these
four classes, the courts seem to have attempted-perhaps unconsciously
-to apply a date for taking the rate of exchange which would be
favorable to the plaintiff.
It seems impossible, therefore, to fix a date for ascertaining the
Pompe (186o, C. P.) 8 C. B. 538; see 2 Daniel, op. cit. sec. 445; 2 Sedgwick,
Damages (9th ed. 1912) sec. 700; see Fraenkel, Some Aspects of the Law
Relating to Foreign Exchange (1920) 20 COL. L.'Rav. 832, 836; ibid. 922; contra,
Cohn v. Boulken (192o, K. B.) 36 T. L. R 767 (the date of trial was held the
proper date).
","It might not be unreasonable to allow the plaintiff to recover on the rate most
favorable to him within a reasonable time after the default, .... for he might
have had to borrow or draw re-exchange to cover his necessities at any time
within that period." (1916) 28 HAxv. L. REv. 873.
'Cockerell v. Barber (181o, Ch.) 16 Ves. 461 (legacy payable in Indian
rupees); Scott v. Bevan (1831, K. B.) 2 Barn. & Ad. 78 (foreign judgment);
Manners v. Pearson [1898] I Ch. 581 (account for money due under contract with
plaintiff's testator; the court disregarded the contract and treated the case as one
of ordinary account) ; Sheehan v. Dalrymple (1869) ig Mich. 239 (contribution
between tenants in common). See also Wormser Bros. v. Marroquin & Co.
(1918, C. C. A. 5th) 249 Fed. 428, 430.
'See (1921) ig MicH. L. REv. 652, 654.
0 Lebeaupin v. Crispin & Co. [1920] 2 K. B. 714; Barry v. Van Den; Hurk
[1920] 2 K. B. 709; Di Ferdinando v. Simon & Co., supra note 2; NOTES (1921)
34 HARv. L. Rxv. 422; (1920) 20 CoL. L. Rxv. 914; (1921) 5 MINN. L. REv.
146; Cf. Katcher v. Amer. Express Co. (192o) g4 N. J. L. 165, lO9 At. 741.
'Kirsh v. Allen (1919, K. B.) 36 T. L. R. 59, overruled in Di Ferdinando v.
Si-mon & Co. [1920] 2 K. B. 704; ibid. [1920, C. A.] 3 K B. 409; Hawes v.
Woolcock (1870) 26 Wis. 629; Marburg v. Marburg, supra note 2; The Hurona,
supra note 3.




amount of the judgment in foreign currency which will always be con-
clusive. As between the date of breach and the date of judgment, the
former seems clearly preferable since the aim of the courts is to make
the plaintiff as nearly whole as possible, and not to enable him to specu-
late in foreign exchange. And where as in the ordinary contract case
performance of a duty is promised for a certain date, it may be, as the
majority of cases seem to hold, that damages for the breach should be
assessed at the current rate of exchange 3 as of that date, both in the
interest of certainty, and because the plaintiff may take steps to protect
himself against non-performance.
But where, as in the tort cases, the breach of duty is unexpected, it
may be unfair not to allow the plaintiff a short period to protect himself.
There is a rule of damages, of fairly wide acceptance in this country,
that on conversion of articles of fluctuating value, particularly stock,1
the plaintiff should have a reasonable time in which to replace the con-
verted articles, and his damage is therefore computed at the highest
value of the articles within a reasonable time after he has notice of the
breach. A similar rule applied here would lead to the selection of the
date when plaintiff reasonably might have repaired his vessel. While
this rule is not definitely applied in the principal case and in other
similar tort cases, the result seems to approximate it.
1 5
LIABILITY OF AN INFANT FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
"Infantile Paralysis" is a term well applicable to the state of the law
governing an infant's responsibility for his contractual and tort obliga-
tions. The rigid niceties involved are indeed perplexing. Infancy has
ever been a safe base from which one might embark upon piratical
expeditions against innocent adults and to the technical defences of
which he could return for security. Shall its sanctity be preserved
when justice obviously requires a remedy for the victims? In Falk v.
McMasters & Co. (I92I) 197 App. Div. 357, an infant had deposited
money with brokers for stock margin and then sought to recover his
loss from an investment made pursuant to his directions. The ground
of recovery was infancy at the time of deposit and at the time of bring-.
ing suit. The brokers' defence, sustained by the court, was that the
infant had induced them to contract with him by falsely and fraudu
lently misrepresenting his age. While the weight of authority seems
to be that an infant is not estopped from using his infancy as a shield
against obligations under a contract induced by his fraud,1 there is a
" In a few old cases the par of exchange was applied. Adams v. Cordis (1829)
25 Mass. 260; Martin v. Franklin (18o9, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 4 John. 124.
' Galligher v. Jones (1889) 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. 335.
5 Cf. McNair, Rate of Exchange in English Judgments (1921) 37 L. QUART.
REv. 38.
'Where the contract is executory, the decisions are practically uniform that the
defence of infancy is not lost Sims v. Everhardt (I88o) 1O2 U. S. 3oo; Tobin
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respectable minority to the contrary.2 Reason and logic are clearly
with this latter view. The instant decision, recognizing refinements of
reason and distinctions of logic independent of precedent, is indeed
refreshing. Iowa and a few other states have already seriously dis-
turbed the traditional privileges of infancy,3 and it is hoped that still
others will do likewise. There is no insuperable difficulty involved,
for although the weight of authority at law is as stated, an infant stands
in a very different position in equity.4 When he has fraudulently mis-
represented his age so as to procure others to contract with him, he
will not be heard to plead his infancy to the prejudice of another. 5
The tort liability of an infant, in law and in equity, is that he is gen-
erally as responsible for his torts as an adult The English courts,7
however, and many American courts,8 deny such responsibility where
the cause of action is so directly connected with a contract that to permit
the action on the tort would be an indirect way of enforcing the con-
tract. So when an infant has induced an adult to contract with him
through fraud and misrepresentation of his age, and a tort action for
v. Spann (1908) 85 Ark. 556, 09 S. W. 534; International Text Book Co. v.
Connelly (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722. Where it has been executed, there
is a conflict, but the weight of authority holds that the infant is not estopped.
Wieland v. Kobick (1884) 11o Ill. 16; Ridgeway v. Herbert (1899) i5o Mo.
6o6, 5I S. W. 1O4O.
'La Rosa v. Nichols (1918) 92 N. J. L. 375, lO5 At. 2O1; County Board of
Education-v. Hensley (1912) 147 Ky. 441, 144 S. W. 63; Lake v. Perry (19o9)
95 Miss. 550, 49 So. 569.
'Iowa Code, 1897, secs. 3189-3190: "A minor is bound not only by contracts for
necessaries but also by his other contracts unless he disaffirms them within a
reasonable time after he attains his majority. .... .No contract can be thus
disaffirmed in cases where on account of the minor's own misrepresentations as to
his majority or from his having been engaged in business as an adult the other
party had good reason to believe him capable of contracting." First National
Bank v. Casey (1912) 158 Iowa, 349, 138 N. W. 897.
'See Tiffany, Law of Persons and Domestic Relations (2d ed. 19o9) 434.
Equity will not give to such an infant affirmative equitable relief. Ex parte
Unity Joint-Stock Mit. Packing Ass'n.. (1858, Ch.) 3 De Gex. & J. 63; Hayes v.
Parker (1886) 41 N. J. Eq; 630, 7 Atl. 511; Rice v. Boyer (1886) Io8 Ind. 472,
9 N. E. 42o (under reformed procedure, the equity rule on this subject appears to
have supplanted the legal rule) ; La Rosa v. Nichols, supra note 2. 'Nor will his
plea of infancy be sustained as a defence when sued in equity by an adult Lem-
priere v. Lange (1879) L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 675; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(3d ed. i9o5) secs. 8,5, 945.
ai Cooley, Torts (3d ed. 19o6) I77.
" This really amounts to denying such responsibility where the tort has any con-
nection whatever with an infant's duties under a contract Johnson v. Pye (1793,
K. B.) i Lev. 169; Price v. Hewett (1852) 8 Exch. 146; Liverpool etc. Ass'n. v.
Fairhurst (1854) 9 Exch. 422; Bartlett v. Wells (1862, Q. B.) i Best & S.
836.
" Carpenter v. Carpenter (1873) 45 Ind. 142; N. Y. B. L. B. Co. v. Fisher (1897)
23 App. Div. 363, 48 N. Y. Supp. 152; Nash v. Jewett (1889) 61 Vt 501, 18 Atl.
47; Covault v. Nevitt (1914) 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W. 1115; Spangler & Co. v.
Haupt (1913) 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 545.
COMMENTS
deceit is brought, the plea of infancy has been available to the infant on
the ground that the cause of action for deceit arose ex contractu. Such
a rule is artificial and arbitrary.9 With the exception of those purely
personal, all torts of infants have some connection, either directly or
indirectly, with a contract; and to follow the rule just stated would in
effect deny the responsibility of an infant for fraud and misrepresenta-
tion in practically every case, an exceedingly undesirable result.1 ° It is
difficult to see how an infant is deprived of all defences, which public.
policy may require, by permitting a cause of action for deceit for
having induced an adult to contract with him through fraud and mis-
representation. Such acts are entirely unconnected with the terms of
the resulting contract except that the latter were induced by the
former; and to hold the infant in tort for deceit can hardly be said to
be H1olding him to the terms of the contract. Here, too, there has been
a decided tendency in redent years to hold an infant in tort even though
it consists entirely in fraudulently inducing an adult to contract with
him." Despite conflicting tendencies in various jurisdictions, it is
becoming increasingly evident that courts of law are gradually coming
to hold an infant to a stricter accountability for acts of fraud and mis-
representation against innocent adults acting in good faith, as has been
true in equity for some time.' 2  All of which is as it should be.
The necessity of accurate legal phraseology is becoming more appar-
ent and more frequently asserted every day. Thus, we find Mr. Justice
Holmes recently saying that "the word 'right' is one of the most decep-
tive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the
premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion."', An accepted defini-
tion of so essential a concept is imperative.2
X, an infant, misrepresents his age to A, an adult, who then contracts with him.
X purchases a machine from A, who has taken advantage of X's business inex-
perience and charged him four times the real value. X, upon learning this, returns
the machine, now in a dilapidated condition, and sues and recovers the purchase
price from A. A thereupon brings an action in tort for deceit against X. The
measure of damages is, clearly, the actual loss suffered by A as a result of X's
misrepresentation, and not four times the value of the machine. It cannot be said,
therefore, that to allow such a cause of action would be indirectly enforcing the
original contract.
"'Fitz v. Hall (1838) 9 N. H. 441.
'
1Fitz v. Hall, supra note io; .Rice v. Boyer, supra note 5; Wallace v. Morss
(1843, N. Y.) 5 Hill, 391; Eckstein v. Frank (1863, N. Y.) i Daly, 334; Patter-
son v. Kasper (1914) 182 Mich. 281, 148 N. W. 69o.
" La Rosa v. Nichols, supra note 2.
'See Avzerican Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (May 16,
1921) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct Term, 192o, No. 679.
'See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptims as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE LAW J ORNAL, 16; (1917) 26 ibid. 710; Corbin,
Legal Analysis and Terminology (igig) 29 ibid. 163.
